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CONTEXT: TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
Separation origins in USA (1980s)
– local connection services separate from long distance
– to encourage competition in long distance market
Increasingly mandated/adopted in telecommunications 
markets in 21st century
– UK, NZ, Sweden, Italy, Australia, EU inquiry …
Proposed regulatory remedy for
– low levels of retail competition emerging under other 
regulatory arrangements
– risk of owner of persistent upstream ‘bottleneck’ network 
asset foreclosing downstream competitive retail entry 
Strategic reasons for voluntary adoption
– foreclosing more intrusive regulatory intervention 
CONTEXT: ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY
Over 20 years experience with separated firms
– retail, generation, distribution
Invoked to:
– increase retail entry, competition
– reduce risk of competitive entry foreclosure 
Vertical re-integration (Meade & O’Connor, 2008):
– increasingly common
– the ‘natural’ state of economic organisation?
– militates against separation-induced
• mismatches in investment horizons between generators and 
retailers
• thin contract markets
• increased hold-up risk
• perverse wholesale risk management incentives
CONTEXT: TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS 
(Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985)
Contractual (short or long term) interaction between 
distinct economic actors (firms and individuals) prevails
– unless costs of undertaking activities within a firm 
(‘internalising’ or ‘vertical integration’) are less than 
the costs of market contracting (separation)
Costs of market contracting include
– transaction costs
– contractual incompleteness, bounded rationality
– costs of contractual hold-up
– costs of market power imbalances (e.g. information 
asymmetries)
– costs of regulation (compliance, distorted incentives, etc)
CONTEXT: OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 
(Hansmann, 1996)
Ownership naturally falls to patrons with lowest 
combined
Costs of ownership
– agency costs
– costs of collective decision-making
– costs of risk-bearing
And costs of market transacting
– transaction costs; contractual incompleteness; bounded 
rationality; costs of contractual hold-up; costs of market 
power imbalances; costs of regulation
VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN ELECTRICITY 
Meade & O’Connor (2008)
Internalises many of the costly consequences of 
contract-based interaction:
– hold-up risks
– wholesale risks
– regulatory uncertainty
– asymmetric information and strategic bargaining
– market power
– ownership costs
– contracting costs
– initial conditions
ELECTRICITY CONCLUSIONS
Some static efficiency gains from separation
But dwarfed by sum of 
– increased governance, ownership costs
– dynamic efficiency losses from misaligned incentives
Natural economic tendency is to re-integrate to more 
effectively and efficiently manage increased costs & 
risks
PARALLELS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
THE MOST IMPORTANT PARALLEL IS NOT 
THE IMMEDIATELY OBVIOUS ONE
Bottleneck assets
– local loop cf. lines companies
But technological innovation means local loop is no 
longer the only means of broadband transmission
More informative to compare retail-generation 
separation
– same motivations
• encourage retail entry
• preclude discriminatory pricing
– same underlying economic characteristics
• cost structures, risk management, asset ownership
• contracting horizon mismatches
• oligopolistic competitive interactions
MISMATCH IN INVESTMENT HORIZONS LEADS 
TO INVESTMENT HOLD-UP
High-value, long-lived (upstream) network assets 
– high fixed, sunk costs
Short-term focus of retail operations
– low entry costs
– few sunk investments cf network operators
When new investment (new technology/increased capacity) 
required
– network operator requires long-term agreements with retailers to 
justify investment
– retailers resist long-term contracts with a single network operator
• long term shifts exogenous risks onto (risk-averse) retailer
• another competing retailer may subsequently negotiate a ‘better deal’
• another (better) network technology may be offered (bypass) 
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; RETAIL 
DEMAND UNCERTAINTY
Separated network operator lacks easily- and cheaply- 
verifiable consumer behaviour information
Low-cost entrants have fewer incentives to take care 
with forecast accuracy
– relatively costless exit
Low-cost, low-risk retail entry encourages over-much 
retail entry (monopolistic competition model)
– entrants do not adequately take account for the effect of their 
entry on the residual demand curve facing other market 
participants when making entry decision
– leads to systematic overestimation of consumer demand
Network operator anticipates effects
– invests in less capacity than ordered by retailers
– invokes regulatory attention for ‘under-investing’
ADDITIONAL CHALLENGES FOR 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Very rapid network technology development occurring 
– relative to electricity generation, distribution
Threat of technology bypass very real
Separated network operator often competing with 
vertically-integrated operators of partial-substitute 
technologies (e.g. mobile, wireless)
– adverse selection problem leads to risk of inefficient entry
– incumbent bears higher costs of separated network, but 
competitor can accrue savings from internalisation via 
integration
– entrant will invest in own network when own cost equals 
incumbent’s cost (including separation costs)
– but incumbent’s network costs (absent separation) are less
– ‘cherry-picking’ – separated company serves most costly 
market segments; vertically integrated least costly
RISKS EXACERBATED BY REGULATORY 
CONTRACT PROVISIONS
Regulated contracts typically finite, short-term
– large renegotiation costs, risks
– militates against long-term retail-network operator contracts
Enable retail entry by parties with negligible assets
– exacerbates investment term incentive mismatch
– encourages excessive and ‘hit & run’ entry (Hausman & Sidak, 2005)
Designed to facilitate low-cost consumer switching
– e.g. number portability 
– lowers retail incentives for long-term contracts even further
Price-setting methodologies (e.g. TSLRIC)
– falling regulated prices simulate ‘future better offers’ effect
IMPLICATIONS
If network investment incentives are to remain neutral 
when separation occurs
Regulatory provisions must be relaxed relative to 
regulation-only counterfactual, e.g.
– mandatory longer-term contracts 
– refraining from frequent TSLRIC-type regulatory price 
reviews
– allowing retailers to lock in consumers for contractually- 
meaningful periods
– requiring upstream mandatory investments in network by 
downstream retail entrants (i.e. mandatory LLU investment)
• aligns retailer incentives with network operators
BUT MANDATORY RETAILER INVESTMENT  
IS VERTICAL RE-INTEGRATION! 
Separation creates investment incentive problems that 
are most efficiently resolved by vertical re-integration
So why mandate separation? 
RETAIL SEPARATION HAS NOT BEEN A 
‘NATURAL’ STATE FOR TELECOMS
Retail lock-in has been important to justify investment
‘Missing markets’ for investor-led firms in high fixed, 
sunk cost industries arise from lack of certainty that 
consumers will support the venture
Historically, most solutions to the ‘missing market for 
investment’ in telecommunications have begun as 
consumer-led vertically-integrated ventures; e.g.
– consumer-owned co-operatives 
• fixed & mobile telephony (Finland)
– government investment (UK, NZ)
• as low-cost means of operating consumer co-operative
– exclusive retail franchises (USA)
• ensure welfare-raising services provided to consumers by 
constraining consumer choice
CASE: CITYLINK (WELLINGTON)
One of world’s longest-established fibre networks 
(1995)
Supplies dark fibre on open-access model
Network extensions have been underwritten by 
contractual agreements with key high-volume 
commercial customers
– customers ‘locked in’ by significant network-specific 
investments
CASE: NZ GOVT ‘FIBRECO’
“By keeping the new fibre business out of retailing, it will 
have no incentives to act anti-competitively”
“The intention is that each LFC will operate purely as a 
“fibre infrastructure carrier”, providing wholesale 
access to dark fibre, and optionally providing other 
wholesale services. It will not provide retail services”. 
“The government will not exclude partners that own or 
operate telecommunications retail operations, but 
such partners may not have the majority of voting 
control on the board of LFC (unless they divest 
themselves of any retail business)”
BUT
“It is expected that the partner will offer both investment 
(by way of capital and/or assets) and the commercial 
and technical ability to deploy and operate a fibre 
network”
“The main risks in this proposal are that: 
a there could be insufficient viable proposals, because 
the Crown offer is not sufficiently attractive”
INDUCING INVESTMENT UNDER THESE 
PROPOSALS WILL BE PROBLEMATIC
Consumer demand for fibre highly uncertain
Multiple bypass/close substitute technologies already 
present
– fibre-to-the-kerb
– increasing capabilities of 3.5G mobile networks
– some are vertically integrated (cost advantages, cherry- 
picking potential)
Rapid technological development in bypass networks 
Retail fibre consumer lock-in issues
– specific investments required, but much larger than under 
bypass technologies => difficult to get retailer/residential 
consumer commitment (especially when regulation of legacy 
technologies encourages easy, low cost switching)
A ‘MISSING MARKET’ FOR INVESTMENT 
PARTNERS?
Removing separation mandate 
– in part addresses investment incentive misalignment by 
enabling integration between retailers (best informed re 
consumer demand and best able to ‘lock in consumers to 
fibre network) and network operation
– will likely increase the share of private sector investment 
committed to NZ fibre deployment
– recognises the reality of competition between vertically 
integrated broadband companies differentiated on 
technology type
• encourages ongoing dynamic network innovation
• prototype is mobile telephony
TELECOMMUNICATIONS CAN LEARN FROM 
ELECTRICITY’S EXPERIENCE
Whilst technologies differ, and there are some industry- 
specific differences, broad principles are the same
Separation for short-term competitive gains risks 
foreclosing long term dynamic efficiency benefits
